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A few years ago, I was at a talk by a distinguished African econo-mist who was reminiscing about 
his life in Malawi post-independence. As 
a youthful leftist, he recalled, he and 
others would undertake campaigns at 
the university and shout slogans like 
“Destroy Capitalism.” With a twinkle in 
his eye, he ended somewhat wistfully: 
“The only problem was that we needed 
capitalists fi rst before we could destroy 
them, and we didn’t have them!”
I was reminded of this story while 
reading Sanjay Baru and Meghnad 
 Desai’s new edited volume on the Bom-
bay plan. Decidedly, unlike in the 
 Malawian story and many other colo-
nised nations, India had a substantial 
capitalist class long predating independ-
ence and therefore, it was something 
that required political accommodation. 
The Bombay Plan: Blueprint for Economic 
Resurgence is ostensibly an economic 
historiography of the document that is 
allegedly lost to history. Perhaps the key 
concern of the book is the relationship 
between the capitalist class and the em-
bryonic nation state. 
As  part of the nationalist aspirations 
of the state, a group of industrialists and 
bureaucrats, comprising G D Birla, Ardeshir 
Dalal,  Kasturbhai Lalbhai, John Mathai, 
Lala Sri Ram, A D Shroff, J R D Tata and 
Purushottamdas Thakurdas came up with 
a blueprint about how to manage the 
 Indian economy after independence. As 
the editors put it, it was “a document that 
was not only prescient in its approach to 
development but was also infl uential in 
shaping economic planning and public 
policy in the fi rst decade of India’s Inde-
pendence.” The document was much 
debated and discussed before it lost steam. 
Nevertheless, some of its key ideas 
 became part of later public policy.
Antecedents and Afterlife 
As a resource, the book provides some 
answers for many questions such as: How 
was it that the capitalist and business 
classes felt and acted to generate a plan for 
economic development that was unabash-
edly nationalist and directive, and which 
had a strong element of social concern? 
How was it that the blueprint came to dis-
appear from the general consciousness? 
What was the ways in which the ideas of 
the plans came into the later fi ve-year 
plans? Why did the national bourgeoisie 
not take charge of the intellectual efforts 
to manage the economy after that? 
And so on.
The book consists of a series of essays on 
the topic, not all contemporary. Perhaps 
the most comprehensive and compelling 
piece is that of Amal Sanyal who identifi es 
the political forces behind the erasure 
of the plan from concrete policymaking. 
He provides a compelling narrative—
the framers of the plan were contending 
with the rise of communist and socialist 
forces on the one hand and a liberal cap-
italist elite on the other, and while there 
were elements of clear compromise in 
the Bombay plan (a central role for plan-
ning, for example), it was not possible 
for the government of the time to openly 
side with the more liberal capitalist order. 
For the Congress, it was embarrassing to 
be in such a position; and for the parties 
of the right, other cultural issues seemed 
to be more important. For the framers of 
the plan themselves, the fact that many 
aspects of their plan were taken in for 
the fi rst plan meant that they did not 
need to take up cudgels on behalf of 
their blueprint and they ins tead made 
their accommodation. A child of no par-
ent, the plan faded away.
A similar set of issues is taken up by 
Meghnad Desai in his chapter as well as 
by Omkar Goswami in his, though they 
focus only on the post-independence 
capitalist class. They broadly argue that 
despite the growing dislike for some of 
the overreach of the government, the 
fact that the capitalist class openly sub-
ordinated itself to the government and 
did not take leadership roles in the 
future was because of the gradual but 
relentless distancing of the bourgeoisie 
from the state. From being potential 
partners in the nation-building project, 
they went to have a more antagonistic 
relationship in the decades to come. 
Goswami’s chapter is clearest in de-
scribing the extent to which political 
powers distanced themselves from the 
plan and from the leading industrial-
ists, all the while using many of the 
insights provided.
The Bombay Plan: Blueprint for Economic 
Resurgence edited by Sanjay Baru and Meghnad Desai, 
New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2018; pp xvii + 343, `500.
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Another noteworthy chapter is by 
Gita Piramal, who chronicles the expe-
riences of Ardeshir Dalal, who might 
rightly be called the true leader of the 
group. His experiences, both in indus-
try as well as the engagement with the 
state, is an endearing glimpse into an 
unusual  personality. 
Tulsi Jayakumar and  R Gopala kri sh-
nan point to a weakness in the Bombay 
plan, specifi cally, its silence on the 
 extent to which plans become a reality 
through actual management. Their dis-
cussion has serious implications as an 
analysis of any national public policy. 
Flexibility, learning and willingness to 
experiment, taking responsibility, cut-
ing off poorly performing programmes 
and supporting well-performing initia-
tives are the hallmark of good opera-
tional management. Indeed, as the work 
of people like Alice Amsden (1989), 
Vivek Chhiber (2009) in the case of 
Korea, Barry Naughton (1996) in the 
case of China, and Peter Evans (1995) in 
the case of Brazil, Nigeria and India, 
these attri butes are often the difference 
between success and failure. As the 
German general Helmuth Von Moltke 
suggested in another context “No plan 
survives contact,” and policymakers must 
be responsive and nimble when their 
plans are undermined or do not roll out 
in the  expected way.
Not all chapters are, however, similarly 
enlightening. The chapter by Ajay Chhiber, 
for example, is a lament for the “state al-
batross,” which he suggests was not 
countered and in fact supported by the 
Bombay plan. There is a brand of mourn-
ful writing among liberals, which seems 
to suggest a possible historical counter-
factual fantasy in which post-independ-
ence India moved towards a liberal mar-
ket economy, grew leaps and bounds 
and became a superpower. The chapter 
by Chhiber follows almost all the tropes 
of this sub-genre: we could have become 
East Asia, state planning was not neces-
sary and so on. But this is simply ahis-
torical (unlike the other chapters) and 
does not recognise the serious con-
straints and opportunities that the coun-
try had at the time. Indeed, what is re-
markable about the fi rst 10 years of post- 
independence India was that the degree 
of experimentation in combining state 
planning with democracy, in attempt-
ing structural transformation, and in 
maintaining independence and coher-
ence as a nation state, all came about, 
at least at the outset, through planning. 
And certainly, the growth turnaround 
in the fi rst decade post independence 
was substantial (as documented by, for 
 example, Deepak Nayyar [2006]). 
Perhaps the most delightful part of 
the book is the appendix, which con-
tains the Bombay plan in its entirety. 
Anyone reading it will recognise it as a 
remarkable document, not only because 
it is, as the editors suggest, ahead of its 
time in terms of development thinking, 
but also because of the level of optimism 
and pragmatism. Here is a group of people 
who are really looking at a potential new 
dawn with clear eyes and an open heart. 
Consider, for example, this following 
extract from Section 7.
Lord Wavell, in a recent speech in London 
remarked: “It has always seemed to me a 
 curious fact that money is forthcoming in 
any quantity for war, but that no nation has 
ever yet produced the money on the same 
scale to fi ght the evils of peace—poverty, 
lack of education, unemployment, ill health 
... fi nance is not the master of a country’s 
economy, but its servant and instrument. 
The real capital of a country consists of its 
resources in materials and man-power, and 
money is imply a means of mobilising these 
resources and canalising them into specifi c 
forms of activity. Looking at the problem 
from this angle, we are convinced that the 
capital expenditure proposed under our 
scheme is well within the limits of ours re-
sources.” 
This is not the statement of a group of 
people who are particularly concerned 
about current-day obsessions such as the 
fi scal defi cit, and instead are seriously 
concerned with the deep questions of 
development.
In Conclusion 
While the book as put together is a useful 
set of essays, it is not without its fl aws. 
Given the nature of the topic and that the 
chapters seem to have been opportunisti-
cally put together (the chapter by Sanyal, 
for example, draws extensively from an 
earlier paper, Lokanathan’s piece is a 
historical refl ection written in 1945 and 
so on), the book is quite incoherent. 
Many chapters are repetitive, because 
the authors understandably have to 
recapitulate the features of the plan. 
This makes for some tedious reading, since 
some aspects of the plan are repeated 
chapter after chapter. Some judicious 
editing and excision of chapters may 
have made it a better book. Certainly in 
this respect it compares  unfavourably to 
Medha Kudaisya’s  (2018) recent book 
on the Bombay plan, which apart from 
having an authorial voice, also is written 
with more verve and clarity.
Taken as a whole, Baru and Desai’s 
edited volume is a valuable addition to 
the historiography of economic policy 
discussions in India. It also provides a 
strong case for thinking about political 
economy writ large. Given the fact that 
India adopted a deep commitment to 
 democracy, all economics needed to 
work its way explicitly through the 
 political process. What becomes clear in 
this is the extent to which plans and 
poli cies refl ect the pulls and pushes of 
poli tical and economic imperatives. As 
such, the book could be valuable in 
some classes and politics courses. It 
could perhaps also inspire similar efforts 
to under stand what happened to other 
very thoughtful efforts (for example, the 
Rajwade Committee’s efforts to specify 
women’s roles in a planned economy). 
These kinds of efforts will help in re-
constructing the history of policy ideas 
and in writing the economic and poli-
tical history of the country in the last 
few decades.
Arjun Jayadev (arjunjayadev@gmail.com) is 
with the Azim Premji University, Bengaluru. 
References
Amsden, Alice (1989): Asia’s Next Giant: South 
 Korea and Late Industrialisation, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Chhiber, Vivek (2009): Locked in Place: State-Building 
and Late Industrialisation in India, Princeton, 
NJ USA: Princeton University Press. 
Evans, Peter (1995): Embedded Autonomy: States 
and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, NJ 
USA: Princeton University Press.
Kudaisya, Medha (2018): Tryst with Prosperity: 
Indian Business and the Bombay Plan of 1944, 
New Delhi: Penguin Random House India. 
Naughton, Barry (1996): Growing Out of the Plan: 
Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–93, Cam bridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
Nayyar, Deepak (2006): “India’s Unfi nished Journey 
Transforming Growth into Development,” Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol 40, No 3, pp 797–832.
